Wanted a Leader
Ahmad Rashid

Hard times, it is said, create the best leaders. The expression however finds little relevance when made out against the backdrop of Kashmir, which has been passing through severest crisis since the inception of militancy in late 1989. Those who believe that leaders are made in crisis might deem it as a great flaw that despite mass support, Kashmir's “freedom” struggle failed to throw up a leadership that could have steered it in proper and positive direction. Many of them attribute lack of serious and astute leadership as the prime reason for the muddle and mess that has swallowed this movement.

But my contention is different. I believe that militancy was, in fact, a frantic reaction to Kashmir's failed political leadership, leaving little scope for managing things politically. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah championed the cause of azadi (plebiscite) for 22 years (1953-75). During this period he got all the love and respect from the people, who adored him no less than a saint. But ironically, the Sher-e-Kashmir, as Abdullah used to be addressed commonly by the people, never reciprocated with the same respect to the sentiment and slogan of the people. He gave away the slogan of azadi in utter disdain and went into an Accord with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975 and that too exclusive on her terms and conditions, only to be installed as Chief Minister of the state. Abdullah's volte-face on azadi slogan dealt a severe psychological blow to a man in the streets and he was fed with a sense of deprivation and defeatist mentality. He not only lost faith and trust in political leadership but was noshed up with the thinking that it (political leadership) was unworthy of realizing his dreams. This frame of mind burst like a volcano when thousands of people came on to the streets in support of the gun when it first made its way into Kashmir in the late eighties. Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, a political platform then floated by around a dozen political groups including Jamaat-e-Islami, found few takers. Common man instead found it an honour in identifying himself with militants. And despite all the vices and weaknesses, militants emerged as heroes. It is perhaps this peoples' support for militants that drove many political beings, directly or indirectly, into the armed movement. The Tehreek virtually died before it could gain even a semblance of recognition and stability. A common reaction to the Hurriyat platform, a few years later, was all the more same. That was vividly established by the fact that the Hurriyat Conference, despite being an amalgam of over two dozen political groups, could not revive the peoples' uprising of 1990. This despite the fact that the amalgam leadership then included militant leaders like Mohammad Yasin Malik, Javid Mir, Shabir Ahmad Shah and dozens others in its echelons on whose call hundreds and thousands of people used to occupy streets for weeks together to ventilate their sentiments in the embryonic days of militancy.The common man kept distance from the politicians even when situation was favoring them. With the emergence of many more guns on the scene - those of the paramilitary forces, Ikhwanis (pro-government militants) and Special Operation Group (SOG) of Jammu and Kashmir Police - the atmosphere in Kashmir took a torrid turn. And it was the common man who appeared to be sweltering under the spewing fire of the guns. The rule book would have suggested them to jump towards the softer option - the political platform of the Hurriyat Conference to get off the heat. But despite this situational compulsion, common people appeared little prepared to align with the political leadership. They, in fact, continued with their antipathy towards political leaders and found it even more convenient to remain as distant onlookers rather than aligning with them. For the common people most of the Hurriyat leaders belonged to the same political culture which had betrayed them.Ironically, this aversion was furthered more by none other than the "leaders of the movement" themselves. Inconsistency in their commitment dealt another blow to their integrity and authority. Hurriyat was formed with a pro Pakistan agenda. Its constitution pleaded for implementation of the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, notwithstanding the fact that Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), standing for complete independence, was an important ingredient of the Hurriyat amalgam. The only other option in Hurriyat constitution was the tripartite talks - among India, Pakistan and Kashmiri representatives - in case any of the three parties disagreed on UN resolutions. Hurriyat leaders however kept on changing their positions ridiculously at the peril of their own credibility.

Given the huge presence of security forces and police around, individually few people would be prepared to speak publicly in favour of militants. But their collective mindset has never faulted on this front. That has expressly been exhibited on the occasions of death of militants at the hands of police and paramilitary forces. But this had never been the case with regard to political activists. Hundreds of political leaders and activists have been killed at the hands of unknown gunmen and security forces in Kashmir. On November 12, 2007 over 20,000 people participated in the burial procession and prayers of four militants at Dooru village near Sopore in northern Baramulla district. The militants had been killed in a 12-hour long gun-battle during which several residential houses were also demolished. But the residents forgot their own collateral losses and instead mourned the loss of the "mujahideen". All the militants were Pakistani nationals with no acquaintances, friends or relatives in Kashmir.
Common people never gave them the same respect, and never treated them at par with militants killed by troops.

To quote just two incidents: Moulvi Mushtaq, political secretary of Mirwaiz Ummer Farooq was shot dead by unknown gunmen inside a mosque at Rajouri Kadal in old Srinagar during mid-day (zuhar) prayers. Advocate Hissam-ud-din, political secretary of Syed Ali Geelani, was killed in the same fashion in his house at Bemina on the outskirts of Srinagar. Both were public faces and had large circles of friends, acquaintances, colleagues and contacts within and outside political and peoples' sections. Their killings, howsoever gruesome these were, did not evoke as much public resentment as one would have expected. Not more than 2000 peoples participated in the burial prayers of Moulvi Mushtaq, notwithstanding the fact that Mirwaiz family enjoys formidable clout in many parts of the interior Srinagar. Supporters of Mirwaiz had to resort to violent methods to enforce a strike in Srinagar's uptown area. This was quite true in case of Hissam-ud-din as well. The strike called to mourn his death evoked partial response and attendance in his jinaza prayers was as thin as that of Moulvi Mushtaq

One more hard reality often ignored while analyzing the Kashmir situation is that the common people never shut their doors on militants. Government statistics say that around 500 militants are presently operating in Kashmir. Most of the clashes between militants and Indian troops do occur in inhabited areas, and it is almost a routine with the troops to destroy the houses and structures used by militants as their shelter-houses. Hardly one would ever hear a sufferer (whose house is destroyed during clash) complaining against militants.
Political psychologists and commentators might be missing these hard points while analyzing the Kashmir situation but government strategists and policy makers have seldom lost sight of this basic fact. Militants are their prime targets. "Kill them (militants) either physically or by inculcating political ambitions in them" is the theme of strategy towards militants. And their game plan is yielding results. Right from Yasin Malik to Imran Rahi, the government has neutralized hundreds of militant commanders. Salahuddin is their next target. They would like him to be on a talking table before he is reduced to a Bilal Lodhi or Mohiuddin Lone. The oft-repeated demand from certain quarters to include Syed Salah-ud-din in dialogue process is a part of this strategy.
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