Wanted a Leader
Ahmad Rashid

Hard times, it is said, create the best leaders. The expression however finds little relevance when made out against the backdrop of Kashmir, which has been passing through severest crisis since the inception of militancy in late 1989. Those who believe that leaders are made in crisis might deem it as a great flaw that despite mass support, Kashmir's “freedom” struggle failed to throw up a leadership that could have steered it in proper and positive direction. Many of them attribute lack of serious and astute leadership as the prime reason for the muddle and mess that has swallowed this movement.

But my contention is different. I believe that militancy was, in fact, a frantic reaction to Kashmir's failed political leadership, leaving little scope for managing things politically. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah championed the cause of azadi (plebiscite) for 22 years (1953-75). During this period he got all the love and respect from the people, who adored him no less than a saint. But ironically, the Sher-e-Kashmir, as Abdullah used to be addressed commonly by the people, never reciprocated with the same respect to the sentiment and slogan of the people. He gave away the slogan of azadi in utter disdain and went into an Accord with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975 and that too exclusive on her terms and conditions, only to be installed as Chief Minister of the state. Abdullah's volte-face on azadi slogan dealt a severe psychological blow to a man in the streets and he was fed with a sense of deprivation and defeatist mentality. He not only lost faith and trust in political leadership but was noshed up with the thinking that it (political leadership) was unworthy of realizing his dreams. This frame of mind burst like a volcano when thousands of people came on to the streets in support of the gun when it first made its way into Kashmir in the late eighties. Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, a political platform then floated by around a dozen political groups including Jamaat-e-Islami, found few takers. Common man instead found it an honour in identifying himself with militants. And despite all the vices and weaknesses, militants emerged as heroes. It is perhaps this peoples' support for militants that drove many political beings, directly or indirectly, into the armed movement. The Tehreek virtually died before it could gain even a semblance of recognition and stability. A common reaction to the Hurriyat platform, a few years later, was all the more same. That was vividly established by the fact that the Hurriyat Conference, despite being an amalgam of over two dozen political groups, could not revive the peoples' uprising of 1990. This despite the fact that the amalgam leadership then included militant leaders like Mohammad Yasin Malik, Javid Mir, Shabir Ahmad Shah and dozens others in its echelons on whose call hundreds and thousands of people used to occupy streets for weeks together to ventilate their sentiments in the embryonic days of militancy.The common man kept distance from the politicians even when situation was favoring them. With the emergence of many more guns on the scene - those of the paramilitary forces, Ikhwanis (pro-government militants) and Special Operation Group (SOG) of Jammu and Kashmir Police - the atmosphere in Kashmir took a torrid turn. And it was the common man who appeared to be sweltering under the spewing fire of the guns. The rule book would have suggested them to jump towards the softer option - the political platform of the Hurriyat Conference to get off the heat. But despite this situational compulsion, common people appeared little prepared to align with the political leadership. They, in fact, continued with their antipathy towards political leaders and found it even more convenient to remain as distant onlookers rather than aligning with them. For the common people most of the Hurriyat leaders belonged to the same political culture which had betrayed them.Ironically, this aversion was furthered more by none other than the "leaders of the movement" themselves. Inconsistency in their commitment dealt another blow to their integrity and authority. Hurriyat was formed with a pro Pakistan agenda. Its constitution pleaded for implementation of the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, notwithstanding the fact that Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), standing for complete independence, was an important ingredient of the Hurriyat amalgam. The only other option in Hurriyat constitution was the tripartite talks - among India, Pakistan and Kashmiri representatives - in case any of the three parties disagreed on UN resolutions. Hurriyat leaders however kept on changing their positions ridiculously at the peril of their own credibility.

Given the huge presence of security forces and police around, individually few people would be prepared to speak publicly in favour of militants. But their collective mindset has never faulted on this front. That has expressly been exhibited on the occasions of death of militants at the hands of police and paramilitary forces. But this had never been the case with regard to political activists. Hundreds of political leaders and activists have been killed at the hands of unknown gunmen and security forces in Kashmir. On November 12, 2007 over 20,000 people participated in the burial procession and prayers of four militants at Dooru village near Sopore in northern Baramulla district. The militants had been killed in a 12-hour long gun-battle during which several residential houses were also demolished. But the residents forgot their own collateral losses and instead mourned the loss of the "mujahideen". All the militants were Pakistani nationals with no acquaintances, friends or relatives in Kashmir.
Common people never gave them the same respect, and never treated them at par with militants killed by troops.

To quote just two incidents: Moulvi Mushtaq, political secretary of Mirwaiz Ummer Farooq was shot dead by unknown gunmen inside a mosque at Rajouri Kadal in old Srinagar during mid-day (zuhar) prayers. Advocate Hissam-ud-din, political secretary of Syed Ali Geelani, was killed in the same fashion in his house at Bemina on the outskirts of Srinagar. Both were public faces and had large circles of friends, acquaintances, colleagues and contacts within and outside political and peoples' sections. Their killings, howsoever gruesome these were, did not evoke as much public resentment as one would have expected. Not more than 2000 peoples participated in the burial prayers of Moulvi Mushtaq, notwithstanding the fact that Mirwaiz family enjoys formidable clout in many parts of the interior Srinagar. Supporters of Mirwaiz had to resort to violent methods to enforce a strike in Srinagar's uptown area. This was quite true in case of Hissam-ud-din as well. The strike called to mourn his death evoked partial response and attendance in his jinaza prayers was as thin as that of Moulvi Mushtaq

One more hard reality often ignored while analyzing the Kashmir situation is that the common people never shut their doors on militants. Government statistics say that around 500 militants are presently operating in Kashmir. Most of the clashes between militants and Indian troops do occur in inhabited areas, and it is almost a routine with the troops to destroy the houses and structures used by militants as their shelter-houses. Hardly one would ever hear a sufferer (whose house is destroyed during clash) complaining against militants.
Political psychologists and commentators might be missing these hard points while analyzing the Kashmir situation but government strategists and policy makers have seldom lost sight of this basic fact. Militants are their prime targets. "Kill them (militants) either physically or by inculcating political ambitions in them" is the theme of strategy towards militants. And their game plan is yielding results. Right from Yasin Malik to Imran Rahi, the government has neutralized hundreds of militant commanders. Salahuddin is their next target. They would like him to be on a talking table before he is reduced to a Bilal Lodhi or Mohiuddin Lone. The oft-repeated demand from certain quarters to include Syed Salah-ud-din in dialogue process is a part of this strategy.
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Of chief ministers and their mentors
By Ahmad Rashid
News Delhi is using its men in Kashmir like Polo horses, and shoots them down once they loose utility and fail to win the race, comments Ahmad Rashid
On July 11, when former RAW chief A S Dulat, in an interview with rediff news portal, said that he viewed Omer Abdullah as the next chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, he only but reminded of a common perception and practice that chief ministers (for JK) are made in Delhi. It must be seen as an act of kindness that New Delhi relieved off the people of Kashmir of a terminally daunting task of electing a chief minister, more particularly when separatist parties and persons have apparently got together to oppose the elections. Like economic packages, political package in the form of a chief minister is no less a favor of New Delhi on the people of Kashmir. Assembly elections are still months ahead but New Delhi declared the result. People of Kashmir have little to bother about who could or should be in-charge of the civil secretariat now.

Exposure of New Delhi’s this year’s election plans by Dulat found Omer Abdullah tower over one and all. Two days later, Omer, on July 13, reciprocated New Delhi’s kind gesture with all that it could have wanted. Omer, at Martyrs’ Graveyard, fired all his salvos indiscriminately targeting both factions of the Hurriyat Conference, PDP and the Congress.

It reminds one of a billboard local Congress party had put up at Humhamma Chowk on airport road during Sonia Gandhi’s visit to Srinagar in April. The billboard read: we are thankful to Mrs. Sonia Gandhi for appointing Ghulam Nabi Azad as chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir. When Azad was appointed chief minister, he was not even member of the State Assembly. His appointment orders came from Congress’s Delhi headquarters three days before Kashmir Congress legislature party (CLP) elected him as its leader in the state Assembly in November 2005. He got elected to the state Assembly several months later. In 2002, it were Dr Manmohan Singh (he was not Prime Minister then) and Ambika Soni, who gave the “good news” to the people of Kashmir that Mufti Mohammad Sayed would be the new occupant of top seat in the civil secretariat. Like Azad Mufti too was not member of the state Assembly then. Mufti’s party PDP had got 16 as against NC’s 28 and Congress’s 20 seats.

Despite being single largest party in the Assembly, the National Conference did not stake claim for government formation. The NC leadership knew that dispensation at New Delhi was not in a mood to oblige them this time. The inkling had come, a couple of months before, in Independence Day message of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee saying elections in Kashmir would be free and fair. More than anyone else, it was Dr Farooq Abdullah who read the exact import of the message: New Delhi was to put money on some other person. Dr Farooq Abdullah and his party had emerged as darling of New Delhi in 1996 when Kashmir was passing through a complete political chaos in the wake of armed movement against Indian rule. The traditional political parties had turned to separatist politics and other mainstream groups like PDP and PDF did not exist then. New Delhi was desperate to look for some bet. Farooq Abdullah came handy. It was Farooq Abdullah’s second bonhomie with New Delhi. Farooq was earlier bestowed with the seat of power by New Delhi in 1986 with the concurrence of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Local Congress was also made to share power with the Abdullah. The partnership lasted beyond 1987-elections—infamous for rigging and manipulation. Farooq had earlier shared bitter relations with New Delhi. He was dislodged from power in 1984 by engineering defection in his party—National Conference—to install his brother-in-law Ghulam Mohammad Shah as the new chief minister of the state. Farooq Abdullah’s fault was that he had tried to see eye-to-eye with the rulers at the Centre. He hosted a conclave of the leaders of India opposed to then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Shah was shown the door even more unceremoniously in 1986 by stage-managing communal clashes—unheard till then—in the valley. The state was brought under direct rule of New Delhi.

Legacy of imposing rulers by New Delhi dates back to 1947 when then Maharaja—Hari Singh—appointed Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah as administrator for Jammu and Kashmir. Though Abdullah merited the position in his own right for his prominence and stature in politics but Maharaja never hid his aversion to Abdullah. It, however, were Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and Sardar Patel, who prevailed on Maharaja to share power with Abdullah. A few years later Abdullah was jailed by his maker—Nehru—only to come up with a new Prime Minister for Kashmir—Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad. But when Bakhshi, in the eyes of New Delhi lost relevance, he was made to resign to pave way for another stooge—Shamsuddin. His government however fell within a few weeks to the peoples’ uprising provoked by the theft of holy relic (SAW) from Hazratbal shrine. New Delhi stepped in again to impose a new Prime Minister—G M Sadiq—who was reduced to chief minister latter. Syed Mir Qasim, a strong aspirant for the position, traveled down to Delhi to parade members of the Assembly before central leadership to make his case but was sent back without giving any audience. Mir Qasim finally found favour with New Delhi after the death of G M Sadiq but was asked to step aside when New Delhi thought it to be the turn of Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah to take charge of the civil secretariat in 1975, ending his 22-year long (1953-75) political wilderness.

Moral of the story: chief ministers are made in Delhi and celebrated in Kashmir. Their positions however, are more or less like polo horses, which are shot down when they lose utility and fail to win the race.
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